Essays on Private Pensions and Workers' Savings Behavior by Karamcheva, Nadezhda
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1736
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2010
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Essays on Private Pensions and
Workers' Savings Behavior
Author: Nadezhda Karamcheva
Boston College
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Economics
ESSAYS ON PRIVATE PENSIONS AND WORKERS’ SAVINGS
BEHAVIOR
a dissertation
by
NADEZHDA KARAMCHEVA
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
December 2010
c© copyright by NADEZHDA KARAMCHEVA
2010
ESSAYS ON PRIVATE PENSIONS AND WORKERS’ SAVINGS
BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT
by
NADEZHDA KARAMCHEVA
Dissertation Committee:
PETER GOTTSCHALK (Co-chair)
SHANNON SEITZ (Co-chair)
ALICIA MUNNELL
In the last thirty years there has been a considerable change in the
way people save for retirement. The once traditional defined benefit plans are
steadily being replaced by now dominant defined contribution plans. The new
type of plans have effectively shifted the responsibility for retirement saving
from the employer to the worker and have thus contributed to the ongoing
debate on the adequacy of retirement income and ways to encourage workers
to save more. This dissertation studies the role of private pensions on workers’
savings decision in the US and the potential impact of policy interventions.
The first essay (co-authored with Geoffrey Sanzenbacher) documents re-
cent trends in growing pension inequality between high and low-income work-
ers, which has coincided with the shift towards defined contribution type of
plans and workers’ voluntary non-participation in such plans. It examines the
question whether extending tax-deferred pensions to uncovered low-income
workers would result in high rates of pension participation and whether it
would succeed in closing the pension inequality gap. To determine how likely
uncovered workers are to participate if given the option, it is important to
control for possible self-selection into jobs. Even though the majority of low-
income workers currently eligible for a voluntary tax-deferred pension plan
choose to participate, it is unclear whether those individuals are representa-
tive of low-income workers in general. Our estimation reveals that workers
currently offered a tax-deferred pension are more likely than otherwise similar
individuals to participate. Thus, current estimates over-predict the fraction
of workers who would participate if voluntary retirement plans were extended
to them. Ignoring selection would overestimate the percent of all low-income
workers that would participate in a tax-deferred savings plan by 25 percent
and the remaining pension inequality gap by 8.1 percentage points.
The second essay further explores how not yet implemented policies
that change the distribution or incentives of different pension plans would af-
fect saving outcomes. For this purpose, it builds-in the endogeneity of pension
coverage into a behavioral model of workers’ employment, consumption and
saving decisions in which both wages and pensions are simultaneously deter-
mined by workers’ job choice decisions. The model is estimated on the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data using the method of indirect infer-
ence. Policy simulations indicate that switching from voluntary to mandatory
contributions in defined contribution plans would result in lower overall pen-
sion coverage and a crowd-out effect with other forms of saving, but an overall
10 percent increase in average wealth accumulations. A complete phaseout
of defined benefit plans, on the other hand, would lead to a 3 percent lower
overall savings for retirement.
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Chapter 1
Pension Participation and
Uncovered Workers
by Nadia Karamcheva and Geoffrey Sanzenbacher
1.1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, defined contribution (DC) pension plans have
become the norm in the private sector, replacing more traditional defined ben-
efit (DB) plans. Unlike DB plans, workers offered a DC plan are not required
to participate. While a majority, 61 percent, of low-income workers eligible
for a DC plan choose participation, this rate is substantially lower than for
high-income individuals. Low participation rates, coupled with low pension
coverage mean only a third of low-income workers are actually enrolled in a
pension.1 Low pension enrollment together with future declines in Social Se-
curity’s generosity imply that 60 percent of low-income workers are at risk
1Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher (2010)
1
of retirement income that cannot maintain their standard of living.2 Thus,
low pension enrollment amongst low-income workers has become a concern of
policymakers; the Obama administration has suggested requiring employers to
automatically enroll employees in IRAs. Indeed, they cite majority participa-
tion among low-income workers as evidence that such a plan would be effective
in ensuring pension coverage. However, caution should be taken when using
the participation rates of workers currently covered to infer how workers not
covered would respond to the policy change. If searching for a job is costly,
then only workers who suspect they will participate in a DC pension would
look for a job offering one. For low-income workers, for whom search costs and
pension contributions represent a large share of their income, this selection ef-
fect may be especially strong. The current literature on pension participation
amongst eligible workers does not control for this selection effect.
In departure from previous work on pension participation, we allow
that workers offered a defined contribution plan may select into jobs offering
plans based on an unobserved propensity to participate. To accomplish this
we estimate two Heckman (1979) type selection models, one with participation
in the plan as the outcome and one with the individual’s contribution to the
plan as the outcome. The first model has been referred to in the literature as
bivariate probit with sample selection.3 The second specification replaces the
2Munnell et al. (2009)
3See Green (2008). This model consists of two latent variable equations, whose errors
have joint normal distribution.
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participation variable with the contribution rate of the worker to his defined
contribution pension. A person’s contribution rate is a censored continuous
variable; the contribution rate is censored below at 0. We estimate this model
via maximum likelihood, controlling for both the censoring and sample selec-
tion.4 In both specifications, the ratio of defined contribution plans to defined
benefit plans in an individual’s state of residence is used as the required exclu-
sionary restriction. Thus, the key assumption is that individuals do not move
to a state to be more likely to obtain a defined contribution pension plan.5
Our analysis indicates that ignoring selection has two consequences: (1) it
overestimates the percent of non-covered workers who would participate in a
DC type plan and (2) it underestimates the effect of income on participation
and thus the gap in participation between low and high-income individuals
that would be still present even if everyone is given access to coverage.
Low participation in DC plans amongst eligible low-income workers
is not surprising; participation removes income from the worker’s pay check
and requires decisions on risk allocation that low-income workers may have
4We use a STATA routine called “cmp”, which accommodates a variety of conditional
mixed processes.
5The results presented in the paper reflect estimation when using a SIPP-derived
ratio of defined contribution plans per state. Ideally one would want to use informa-
tion on availability of pension plans, coming directly from employers. One way is to
obtain this variable from IRS Form 5500. See 5500-CRR Data, Panel of Current and
Usable Form 5500 Data, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, available at:
http://crr.bc.edu/frequently requested data/data on the form 5500 annual reports.html.
Using information from Form 5500 Data in our empirical specification produces results
which are similar qualitatively but somewhat different quantitatively. One reason could
be that in the IRS forms the reported state of the firm is not necessarily the one where
its’ workforce operates. To the extent that those two differ, so would our estimate of the
state-level ratio of DC to all pension plans.
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difficulty making. Previous literature has found a positive relationship between
participation and income for workers offered a defined contribution plan. For
example, Huberman et al. (2007) show that an increase in compensation of
$10,000 leads to a 3.7 percent increase in the probability of participating in an
offered defined contribution plan. Similarly, Bassett et al. (1998) find that a
$1,000 increase in family income yields a 0.3 percent increase in the probability
of participation in an offered defined contribution plan. Munnell et al. (2009)
utilize data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and find a similarly positive
relationship between an individual’s income and the decision to participate in
an offered defined contribution pension. This can be interpreted as the effect
of income on pension participation for the group of individuals offered defined
contribution plans. This result may not be useful to policy makers who wonder
how individuals not being offered plans respond when enrolled in an IRA.6
The results indicate that ignoring the selection into defined contribu-
tion jobs leads to estimates for the pension participation equation that do
not apply to the population at large. In a probit on individuals offered a de-
fined contribution plan, the marginal effect of log income on participation is
6.7 percent; once controlling for selection that estimate increases to 11.9 per-
6A crucial difference between the Obama Administration’s plan and employer provided
DC plans is automatic enrollment. In the Administration’s plan, the default is partici-
pation while for the employer provided plans we use for estimation the default is usually
non-participation. Madrian and Shea (2001) examine how automatic enrollment increases
participation rates. Our estimates will not account for this, but the selection effect we find
indicates current non-covered workers may be more likely to opt out of a plan.
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cent. Furthermore, the estimate of the correlation between unobservables in
the selection equation and those leading to participation equation is positive.
Thus, individuals not offered a defined contribution plan will be less likely to
participate than observably similar individuals who were offered a plan. Our
estimates indicate that a policy extending matched tax-deferred saving plans,
similar to defined contribution plans, to all low-income individuals would re-
sult in participation rates of 42 percent. Without controlling for selection that
estimate is much higher, around 56 percent.7
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, we describe recent
trends in pension offer rates and participation across income groups. In section
1.3 we discuss the econometric specification we use to determine the effect of
different factors on pension participation. In section 1.4 we discuss results and
in section 1.5 we conclude.
1.2 Trends in Pension Access and Participa-
tion
Our interest, and the interest of policy makers, in the pension participa-
tion of low-income workers follows from the drop in pension participation for
7The 42 percent figure for low-income participation should be viewed as a lower bound
on participation in the plan. As mentioned earlier, the purposed plan includes automatic
enrollment which has been shown to increase participation. Our data does not include
information on automatic enrollment. For example, see Madrian and Shea (2001).
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low-income workers that has accompanied the shift to voluntary DC pensions.
Pension participation is the result of two events: 1) access to a retirement plan,
and 2) enrollment in a plan. Figure 1.1 shows the share of individuals working
for an employer that sponsors a plan over the last three decades. Plan spon-
sorship clearly differs by earnings group. Only about one-third of individuals
in the bottom third work for an employer that sponsors a plan, compared with
over 70 percent for the highest earnings group.8 Overall, pension sponsorship
has remained relatively stable.
Figure 1.1: Pension Sponsorship, all Private Sector Male Workers Age 25-64,
by Earnings Tercile, 1979-2008
Source: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population
Survey (CPS), 1980-2008.
In contrast, the participation rates for workers whose employers provide
8Earnings were defined as the reported monthly earnings on the first listed job.
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a plan have shown considerable divergence among earnings groups over time
(see Figure 1.2). While workers in the top third have had a nearly constant
participation rate over the past 25 years, the rate for the middle third declined
considerably – from 94 to 86 percent – and for the lowest third fell sharply –
from 85 to 69 percent. These drops could be the result of a number of factors,
ranging from ineligibility to misinformation about the plans to an inability to
contribute due to budget constraints.
Figure 1.2: Pension Participation Rate for Private Sector Male Workers Age
25-64 at Employers with Pensions, by Earnings Tercile, 1979-2008
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1980-2008 CPS.
The data on pension access and participation together determine the
overall participation rate, as shown in Figure 1.3. The biggest drops in overall
participation occurred among middle and low earners, where the rate fell by 22
7
and 29 percent, respectively. Decreasing participation rates among low earners
at sponsoring employers is the main driver of the group’s overall decline in
participation rather than any dramatic change in its’ access to pensions.
Figure 1.3: Pension Participation Rate for Private Sector Male Workers Age
25-64, by Earnings Tercile, 1979-2008
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1980-2008 CPS.
These figures illustrate the importance of understanding the relation-
ship between pension participation and income. The participation rate of low-
income workers has dropped not because employers are offering them plans
with less frequency but because the plans they are being offered are increas-
ingly voluntary. Indeed, low-income workers have a variety of reasons for
choosing not to participate in an offered pension. The most frequent reason
is their low-income itself. While defined benefit plans are funded through em-
8
ployer contributions that do not directly decrease a worker’s paycheck, partic-
ipation in a defined contribution plan lowers a worker’s take home pay. Thus,
low-income workers may be less willing to trade off today’s consumption for to-
morrow’s than a similar high-income individual. Low-income workers may be
less likely to participate for other reasons, including lack of knowledge about
the benefits of participation or inability to take the steps to enroll. This is
evident when examining figure 1.4, which shows that 27 percent of low-income
workers voluntarily decline participation in offered defined contribution plans,
with 16 percent doing so because of their low-income.9
Figure 1.4: Percent of Eligible Private Sector Male Workers Age 25-64 Declin-
ing Defined Contribution (DC) Plans, 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations from 2007 SIPP.
9An additional 33 percent of low income workers were ineligible for the offered defined
contribution plan and thus did not voluntarily decline participation.
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The concern of our study is that a voluntary non-participation rate of 27
percent should be viewed as a lower bound for low-income workers in general.
Put another way, workers offered defined contribution plans may be the most
likely to participate in such plans, having selected into a job that offers a
mechanism for deferred compensation. If this is the case, policies aimed at
providing voluntary savings plans amongst non-pensioned individuals would
have lower participation rates than are seen in the pensioned population. In the
next section, we present our empirical strategy for uncovering what determines
pension participation.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Data
We use data from the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In each panel of the SIPP, workers
were asked a topical module entitled “Retirement Expectations and Pension
Plan Coverage.” This topical module posed a series of questions on whether or
not their present employer provided a pension, whether or not the individual
participated in that pension, the type of pension the individual was offered,
the individual’s contribution rate if the pension was a defined contribution
10
plan10 and whether the employer provides a matching contribution.11 This
information, combined with the SIPP’s core information on an individual’s
demographic characteristics and employer characteristics make the SIPP a
good data set for estimating the relationships we have in mind.
For people offered a pension plan, we divide individuals into two cate-
gories: individuals offered a defined contribution plan and individuals offered
a defined benefit plan. For workers who participated in their plan, individu-
als who claimed their benefit was based on earnings or years on the job are
classified as defined benefit workers while workers who claimed they had an
individual account plan are classified as defined contribution workers. If a
worker chose not to participate in their plan a follow-up question asks if the
plan they declined was a tax-deferred plan. If they answered “yes” to this
question then they are classified as having been offered a defined contribution
plan. Otherwise, we assume they were simply ineligible for an available defined
benefit plan.12
10In practice, determining an individual’s contribution rate required examining a series
of variables. Some individuals responded to a question on their percent of earnings con-
tributed to the defined contribution pension. For these individuals, this rate was defined as
their contribution rate. Some individuals did not answer this question but instead gave a
contribution amount and frequency. This was used together with their income to determine
a contribution rate.
11In the 1996 panel, the “availability of employer match” question was not asked to
non-participants in the DC plan. Instead, we imputed the missing values of the variable
by using observations from the 2004 and 2007 panel and STATA’s hotdeck routine. Hot-
deck stochastically imputes observations by matching individuals on user-specified vari-
ables. The ones that we used included firm size, industry, union status and the ra-
tio of DC to DB plans in worker’s state. More info about “hotdeck” can be found at:
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s366901.html
12In general, workers cannot decline participation in a defined benefit plan if they are
eligible. Thus, we assume if they did not participate in an offered defined benefit plan that
11
Aside from pension plans, the core data of the SIPP provides informa-
tion on individual and employer characteristics that are likely to be associated
with pension offers and participation. This information includes an individ-
ual’s age, race, education, marital status, state of residence, and child status.
The data also include an individual’s income from work and their net worth.
On the employer side, the size of the worker’s employer, whether or not the
employee is covered by a union, the worker’s tenure at their current firm,
and the industry of employment were also obtained from the SIPP. Tables 1.1
through 1.4 present descriptive statistics of the workers in our sample. Table
1.1 examines pension coverage by type of plan across income groups. Over-
all 46 percent of the workers in our sample have access to a pension plan at
their job.13 About 26 percent of those plans are Defined Contribution and
20 percent are Defined Benefit. In addition, pension coverage increases by in-
come terciles - 19.3 percent for the bottom income group compared with 69.7
percent for the top one.
Table 1.2 focuses on workers who have access to a defined contribution
pension and examines their conditional contribution and participation rates.
Among workers who are already with a firm that provides a DC type plan,
they were ineligible for that plan.
13Notice that this number is lower than what other studies usually report because our
definition of “offered a pension plan” requires sponsorship on the part of the employer and
worker eligibility. In that respect, workers who are currently not eligible to participate in
the plan (for whatever reason) are classified as not being offered one. This definition is
necessitated by the fact that in our estimation we want to explore the decision to voluntary
participate in a plan - which is only viable if the worker is already eligible.
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79.7 percent choose to participate - 62.2 percent for those in the lowest income
tercile, compared with 89 percent for those in the highest. Even though par-
ticipation rates correlate highly with income, once we control for participation,
contribution rates as a percent of salary do not seem to have a clear relation-
ship with income. Among workers already participating (i.e. contributing a
positive amount), the mean contribution rate is 7.4 percent; 8.8 percent for the
bottom income tercile compared with 7.4 percent for the top income tercile.14
Our intuition is that workers who are currently at DC sponsoring jobs
are potentially different from those who are not, due to unobservable dif-
ferences in tastes or constraints, which makes them more or less likely to
participate in an offered DC plan. They are also different in terms of observ-
able characteristics. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 compare how different these groups
of workers are in terms of observable characteristics. Workers in our sample
who have access to DC plans are older, more likely to be married, more likely
to be white, and have more education than other workers. In addition, their
mean annual income is about $15,000 higher and their net worth is $18,000
higher than that of workers who currently don’t have access to a DC plan.
In addition, those workers who decide to participate in the DC plan are more
14We examined the 401(k) participation and contribution rates by income brackets as
well, even though we did not include them in the paper. The results are largely consistent
with previous literature that uses SIPP data. See for example Engen et al. (1994), Poterba
et al. (1994) and Poterba et al. (1995). It should be noted that overall 401(k) eligibility and
conditional participation rates are higher in our sample as compared to what those previous
studies report. This could be due to the fact that we focus on individuals, rather than
families and that our data comes from more recent panels of the SIPP when DC plans have
already become the most popular type of employer-provided pensions.
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likely to be male and married, are older, have more education and have longer
tenure with their current employer compared with workers who choose to not
participate. They also have higher income, wealth and net worth than the
non-participating group. In addition, 87 percent of the participating workers
have an employer match at the job, compared to 79 percent of those not par-
ticipating. This is consistent with previous studies that find a positive link
between the existence of employer match and the likelihood of participation.
Finally, we use the SIPP data and the respondents’ information as to
type of pension plans available at the job, to also obtain information on the
proportion across states of defined contribution versus all pension plans avail-
able to workers. This ratio differs by state and over time.15
1.3.2 Modeling the Participation Decision
The goal of our empirical framework is to derive consistent estimates of
the effect of income (and other factors) on DC participation. This will inform
us as to what DC participation rates to expect as a result of a policy changes
extending coverage. We also want to know how the policy effect will differ
15As mentioned earlier, ideally we would like to have this information from the employer
side directly. In previous specifications, we used data from the IRS Form 5500. The Form
5500 is a tax form filled out by employers who offer a pension plan. Importantly, the form
asks for characteristics of the plan that can be used to determine whether a plan was defined
benefit or defined contribution. The form also asks how many workers are covered by the
plan and how many individuals work at the offering firm. However, because it is not clear
how much bias the discrepancy between the employers’ reported state in the IRS form and
the actual state of the firm’s operation adds to the estimation, we used the SIPP-derived
variable for all of the estimation results reported in this chapter.
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by income groups. In order to achieve these two goals we need an empirical
specification which controls for the possible self-selection of workers into jobs
with pension plans. Our hypothesis is that workers who are currently in DC
sponsoring jobs differ systematically and in unobservable ways from workers
not offered a DC plan. Failure to control for selection into jobs providing
defined contribution plans will lead to parameter estimates of the decision to
participate that do not apply to the average individual and will lead to biased
conclusions in terms of policy effects.
The decision to participate in an offered 401(k) plan is discrete. Whether
the worker is offered a 401(k) plan is also a discrete outcome. In addition, we
want to allow the unobservable that affects the probability of being offered a
401(k) plan to be correlated with the unobservable that affects the worker’s
decision to choose participation. The empirical setup that achieves both is
a bivariate probit model with sample selection as described in Green (2008).
This formulation was first presented by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) and
applied to our question of interest has the following basic set up:
p1 = Pr[Offered DC = 1] = Φ(z
′γ) (1.1)
p2 = Pr[Participate = 1|Offered DC = 1] = Φ(x′β) (1.2)
15
where
x = {demographics, tenure at current job, annual income, wealth, ...}
z = {demographics, annual income, wealth, union status, DC ratio by state, ...}
We make the usual assumption that the errors in the two equations have
the standard normal distribution and ρ is a correlation parameter denoting
the extent to which the two error co-vary. When ρ 6= 0, standard probit
techniques applied to equation (1.2) yield biased results. To achieve consistent
and asymptotically efficient estimate of β we need to account for the sample
selection. In addition, for the model to be identified, the selection equation
should have at least one variable that is excluded from the outcome equation.
Otherwise, the model is identified only by functional form, and the coefficients
have no structural interpretation. The exclusionary restriction should alter
the probability an individual is offered a defined contribution pension plan but
not the probability he participates in that plan. In our empirical specification
union status and the proportion of defined contribution to all pension plans as
offered by employers in the given state, serve as exclusionary restrictions. The
identifying assumption is that workers do not move into states because they
want a better/worse chance of being offered a defined contribution pension
plan and that being at an union job affects one’s probability of having access
to a 401(k) plan but not his propensity to save. We believe that both of these
16
assumptions are reasonable as long as they capture variation in the availability
of 401(k) plans coming form the employer side and are exogenous factors in
the workers’ saving decisions. On the other hand, one could argue that given
enough time employers would respond to changes in the environment (such
as the introduction of new government policy) and it would be no longer
appropriate to assume such factors are exogenous. Because our empirical
specification is not able to capture such dynamics, it is advisable to interpret
the results as indicative of short-term rather than long-term effects of the
policy.
1.3.3 Modeling the Contribution Rate
From a policy point of view it is interesting to determine what effect
the extension of 401(k) plan availability will have on the contribution rates of
people who decide to participate. In our second empirical specification we are
interested in how much the employees chose to contribute to their 401(k) plans.
Similarly to before, we need to control for sample selection. In addition, we
need to take into account the fact that even though continuous, the outcome
variable is censored from below at 0. This is due to the fact that workers
cannot choose to contribute less than 0 percent. In the absence of censoring,
it would have been appropriate to use the standard Heckman MLE or 2-step
selection model. Ignoring the censoring, however, would lead to biased results.
17
Instead we refer to our approach as “censored regression with sample
selection”. The participation equation is given by:
p = Pr[Offered DC = 1] = Φ(zγ)
z = {demographics, annual income, wealth, union status, DC ratio by state, ...}
while the structural equation takes the following form:
Contribution Rate∗ = x′β + 2
Contribution Rate = max(0, Contribution Rate∗) if Offered DC= 1
Contribution Rate = . if Offered DC= 0
where
x = {demographics, tenure at current job, annual income, wealth, ...}
Contribution Rate∗ is the worker’s desired contribution rate and Contribution
Rate is the one observed in the data, which is missing for individuals not of-
fered a 401(k) plan. We make the standard assumption of homoskedasticity
and joint normality of the errors in the two equations, where ρ denotes the
correlation coefficient. We use the same exclusionary restriction as in the pre-
vious specification. The model is estimated via maximum likelihood.16 Table
1.8 compares results achieved by running a regression on the contribution rate
16We do the maximum likelihood estimation using STATA “cmp” routine – an estimation
routine that accommodates a variety of conditional mixed processes. For more information
on “cmp” see Roodman (2007) and Roodman (2009).
18
ignoring selection, a censored regression model, and a selection model with
censoring.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Participation Decision
Table 1.5 compares estimation of a probit model on participation without
controlling for selection and while controlling for selection, the “Heckman Pro-
bit.” The right hand column provides the estimates of the selection equation.
The results of the probit and the probit with selection are largely con-
sistent with the literature with respect to sign and significance. Similarly to
previous studies,17 we find that individuals who are married, well educated,
have high tenure at their firm, and work at firms with a employer match18 are
all more likely to participate than others. Blacks and younger individuals are
17See for example Munnell et al. (2009) and Bassett et al. (1998).
18Most previous studies find that employees respond positively to the existence of an
employer match. Munnell et al. (2009) find a significant positive effect of the employer
match on contribution rates, although the relationship is concave with respect to the size
of the match. Similarly, Bassett et al. (1998) find that workers with employer matches are
more likely to participate in 401(k) plans than workers without such matches. No evidence is
found that the level of the employer match has a positive impact on employee participation,
however. Kusko et al. (1998) found little change in either participation or contributions
in response to large changes over time in matching provisions. Papke (1995) showed that
participation increases with the level of the match rate, with smaller marginal effects at
higher match rates, and that contributions increase markedly as the employer moves from
a zero to a positive match rate, with a negative effect at very high match rates. Papke and
Poterba (1995) concluded that participation increases with the match rate but found no
significant effect on contributions. Clark and Schieber (1998) found a positive effect of the
match rate on both participation and contributions, but their sample contained no firms
without a match rate.
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less likely to participate. Also consistent with expectations, individuals with
high networth and high-income are more likely to participate in an offered
defined contribution plan than other individuals.
These results are not in any way surprising - previous literature has
already documented similar (in terms of direction and significance) relation-
ships between the independent variables and 401(k) plan participation. What
is interesting is the change in the magnitudes of the effects once we control for
selection.
Our intuition led us to two testable implications: (1) workers’ selec-
tion on unobservables into defined contribution jobs is positively correlated
with unobservables related to participation; and (2) the effect of income on
participation without controlling for selection will be underestimated. The
estimates suggest these implications hold in the data. The estimated corre-
lation between unobservables in the outcome and participation equations is
.251. A likelihood ratio test shows this correlation is significantly different
from 0. This suggests individuals in defined contribution jobs are more likely
to participate than similar individuals in jobs not offering these pension plans.
The effect of income is also smaller in the equation estimated without controls
for selection. In the simple probit model the marginal effect of log income on
pension participation is 6.7 percent, when controlling for selection it is 11.9
percent. This shows us that in the population low-income workers are much
20
less likely than high-income workers to participate in a defined contribution
type pension plan. However, in the selected sample this difference is mitigated
by selection into the plan. If one is to predict the effect of policies targeted at
the whole population but ignores the selection effect, he is likely to understate
the importance of income and the disparity of the policy effect among income
groups.
Let us illustrate this point with the recently proposed government plan
to extend DC-type coverage to workers not currently covered by a plan. Our
estimates indicate that the predicted participation rate for this population
taken from the current literature would be an overestimate. Tables 1.6 and
1.7 indicate the size and magnitude of this overestimation under two different
assumptions: (1) all defined contribution plans offer a match (employer and
government) at the same rate as the average firm in our sample, and (2) none
of the defined contribution plans provide a match.19
Table 1.6 indicates that if matched defined contribution plans were pro-
vided to all individuals a standard probit would suggest that 74.5 percent of
individuals would participate.20 This number is lower than the percent that
participate in actual offered plans only because of observable differences be-
tween those offered and those not offered a defined contribution pension. Once
19In President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union Address the plans were proposed to be
similar to IRAs and thus would not provide a match.
20The differences discussed below are similar if the plans are not matched. These differ-
ences can be calculated from table 1.7.
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controlling for selection, the predicted participation rate drops to 65.0 percent.
This drop occurs because the group of people not already offered plans is sub-
stantially less likely to participate based on unobserved characteristics. This
factor is not captured by the probit alone. If we examine the low-income
group, the group commonly associated with the extension of defined contri-
bution plans, we see an even larger difference. Under the probit estimation,
56.0 percent of individuals in the lower tercile of the income distribution would
participate if all were offered a defined contribution pension plan. Once con-
trolling for selection, this drops to 42.4 percent, a drop of 13.6 percentage
points. In addition, the difference is larger for low-income individuals than
individuals in the middle and higher terciles. For those groups the difference
is 9.9 and 5.5 percentage points respectively. Ignoring selection seems to have
especially large ramifications for low-income workers, the group most likely to
be affected by any potential effort to expand coverage. In addition, ignoring
selection would make us expect a smaller gap in participation rates between
low and high-income groups. Specifically, the probit model would suggest a
difference of 32.4 percentage points in participation rates after the expansion
of the policy. In contrast, when controlling for selection one would expect a
much higher pension inequality of 40.5 percentage points.
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1.4.2 Contribution Decision
Our second model uses information on contribution rates instead of on
participation. In this model, an individual offered a defined contribution plan
participated if they contributed greater than 0 percent of their income. If they
contributed nothing, then they were classified as a non-participant. Thus, the
contribution rate is a censored dependent variable that is the result of selection
into a defined contribution job. The results are presented in table 1.8. The
results from a simple OLS, a censored regression, and a selection model with
censoring are included in the table.
The results in table 1.8 are largely consistent with the results of the par-
ticipation model. An individual’s age, the existence of an employer match, and
a higher level of education are all associated with higher contribution rates.
On the other hand, children and being black are associated with lower contri-
bution rates. Individuals with higher income and with higher net worth have
higher contribution rates than others. As in the previous model, the effect of
income is underestimated in the equations not controlling for selection. In the
OLS estimation, the effect of log income is actually negative and significant,
while in the censored model and the censored model with selection it is pos-
itive, although imprecisely estimated. The analysis of the contribution rates
confirms the analysis of the participation equations: there is positive selection
into defined contribution jobs and ignoring this selection leads to underesti-
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mation of the effect of income on pension participation. It also provides some
insight on contribution rates should defined contribution plans be extended
to more individuals. Controlling for selection in the participation equation re-
vealed that basing estimates of expected participation rates on those currently
offered pensions will overestimate the overall participation rate. A similar re-
sult holds for pension contribution rates, as can be seen in tables 1.9 and 1.10.
We will focus on estimates based on the assumption that all defined contribu-
tion plans, including those provided by the government, are matched at the
average rate. The standard regression predicts that the average participating
individual from the population would contribute 5.4 percent of their income to
their defined contribution plan. After controlling for censoring and selection,
the contribution percentage drops to 4.3 percent. This decline is of similar
magnitude across income groups.21
The results from the participation and contribution equations suggest
that ignoring selection will have two effects: (1) it will overestimate the par-
ticipation rate and overestimate it the most for low-income workers; and (2)
it will overestimate contribution rates similarly for all income groups. The
implication of these results should be considered when making policies that
extend defined contribution plans to low-income individuals. The estimates
21The censored model with selection yielded a percent participating that was likely too
high. About 85 percent of individuals had a positive predicted contribution rate above 0
percent, which is well above 57.5 percent suggested by the probit. A possible explanation
could be the existence of severe measurement error in the contribution rate variable.
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suggest both participation rates and contribution rates will be lower than is
suggested by the current literature.
1.5 Conclusion
As defined contribution plans have expanded over the last three decades,
pension participation amongst low-income individuals has fallen more than for
any other group. This decline has been driven by the voluntary decision of
many low-income individuals to decline participation in offered pension plans.
This decline, combined with perceived future decreases in Social Security’s
generosity, have led many to believe extending tax-deferred savings plans to
low-income individuals is a way to ensure them an acceptable retirement in-
come. Given that 60 percent of eligible low-income workers offered a defined
contribution pension participate in the plan, on the surface at least, this seems
like an effective strategy. Our analysis suggests this picture may be too opti-
mistic.
Our intuition suggested, and our estimation confirms, that workers may
select into defined contribution jobs based on some unobserved propensity to
participate in the plan. The implication of this selection is that individuals
not currently at jobs offering defined contribution plans may be especially
unlikely to contribute to a tax-deferred savings plan. This may be especially
true of the low-income population for whom the selection effect may be strong.
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Our estimates suggest that the selection effect is non-trivial. Controlling for
selection leads to the prediction that only 42 percent of individuals in the
lower income tercile are likely to participate in an offered tax-deferred savings
plan. Those who do participate are likely to contribute 3.1 percent of their
income to the plan. Offering these kinds of savings vehicles to individuals not
covered by a pension plan may be helpful to those who participate. However,
by controlling for the selection of workers into pensioned jobs we believe our
estimates show that fewer individuals will participate than policymakers might
hope.
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Table 1.1: Percent of Workers with Pension Coverage by Type of Plan and by
Income
Offered a Pension∗ DC type DB type
All 46.0% 25.9% 20.1%
Bottom Income Tercile 19.3% 11.0% 8.3%
Middle Income Tercile 49.0% 28.5% 20.5%
Top Income Tercile 69.7% 38.3% 31.4%
∗ Where “offered a pension” means the worker is with an employer who
sponsors a pension plan and the worker is eligible to participate.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
Table 1.2: 401(k) Sponsorship, Participation and Contribution Rates by In-
come
DC Conditional Conditional
Sponsorhip Participation Contribution
Rate Rate Rate
All 25.9% 79.7% 7.4%
Bottom Income Tercile 11.0% 62.2% 8.8%
Middle Income Tercile 28.5% 74.0% 6.9%
Top Income Tercile 38.3% 89.0% 7.4%
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Workers by 401(k) Sponsorship
Variable Not Offered DC Offered DC
Female 48.8% 46.6%
% Married 52.3% 63.1%
% with Children 44.3% 43.9%
% White 82.7% 85.9%
% Black 11.6% 8.5%
Age 37.4 40.3
Years of Education 12.9 13.8
Tenure 6.1 7.7
Mean Income $28,522 $43,783
Mean Wealth $157,167 $176,621
Mean Net Worth $148,434 $166,831
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
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Table 1.4: Characteristics of Workers Offered 401(k) Plans by Participation
Status
Variable Do Not Participate Participate
Female 53.8% 44.7%
% Married 49.5% 66.6%
% with Children 43.6% 43.9%
% White 80.1% 87.4%
% Black 13.7% 7.2%
Age 36.5 41.2
Years of Education 13.1 14.0
Tenure 4.3 8.5
Mean Income $28,769 $47,609
Mean Wealth $102,333 $ 195,552
Mean Net Worth $92,620 $185,741
Employer Provides a Match 79.0% 87.1%
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
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Table 1.5: 401(k) Participation Models
Probit Probit with Selection
Outcome eq-n Sel. eq-n
Marg Marg
Variable Coeff SE Prob Coeff SE Prob Coeff SE
Female -.069∗∗ .023 -.017∗∗ -.050 .023 -.018∗ .068∗∗ .011
Age .119∗∗ .032 .029∗∗ .171∗∗ .033 .063∗∗ .288∗∗ .014
Age2 -.002∗∗ .001 -.001∗∗ -.003∗∗ .001 -.001∗∗ -.007∗∗ .000
White .060 .046 .015 .066 .045 .025 .059∗∗ .023
Black -.147∗ .057 -.038∗ -.158∗∗ .055 -.059∗∗ -.059∗∗ .028
Married .112∗∗ .025 .028∗∗ .112∗∗ .025 .041∗∗ .012 .013
Has kids -.042 .025 -.010 -.050∗ .025 -.018∗ -.042∗∗ .012
Years educ .046∗∗ .005 .011∗∗ .048∗∗ .005 .018∗∗ .015∗∗ .002
Tenure .040∗∗ .002 .010∗∗ .038∗∗ .002 .014∗∗
DB at old job .039 .064 .010 .056 .063 .020 .085∗∗ .030
DC at old job .008 .053 .002 .050 .053 .018 .230∗∗ .028
Provides match .406∗∗ .029 .106∗∗ .405∗∗ .028 .149∗∗
Log Networth .075∗∗ .006 .019∗∗ .076∗∗ .006 .029∗∗ .015∗∗ .003
Year 2004 -.013 .030 -.002 .003 .030 .001 .059∗∗ .014
Year 2007 -.243∗∗ .027 -.061∗∗ -.227∗∗ .027 -.084∗∗ -0.059∗∗ .014
Log Income .274∗∗ .018 .067∗∗ .324∗∗ .020 .119∗∗ .278∗∗ .008
DC ratio 1.952∗∗ .079
Union Status -.210∗∗ .018
ρ .251 .053
LR test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0): chi2(1) = 19.99 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
N uncensored 19,582
N censored 19,582 53,941
N all 19,582 73,523
* Significantly different from 0 at .05 level.
** Significantly different from 0 at .01 level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. 33
Table 1.6: Predicted Probabilities of Participation in 401(k) if All 401(k) Plans
Provide and Employer Match
Probit Probit with Selection
All 74.5% 65.0%
Bottom Income Tercile 56.0% 42.4%
Middle Income Tercile 75.6% 65.7%
Top Income Tercile 88.4% 82.9%
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
Table 1.7: Predicted Probabilities of Participation in 401(k) if No 401(k) Plans
Provide an Employer Match
Probit Probit with Selection
All 64.7% 52.5%
Bottom Income Tercile 41.8% 29.4%
Middle Income Tercile 62.8% 51.4%
Top Income Tercile 79.7% 72.2%
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
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Table 1.8: 401(k) Contribution Rate Models
Least Squares Censored Regression Censored Regression
with Sample Selection
Outcome eq-n Sel. eq-n
Variable Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Female -.616∗∗ .093 -.703∗∗ .120 -.710∗ .120 .066∗∗ .011
Age .557∗∗ .138 1.338∗∗ .194 1.315∗∗ .193 .283∗∗ .014
Age2 -.011∗∗ .003 -.028∗∗ .005 -.028∗∗ .005 -.006∗∗ .000
White -.054 .191 -.024 .244 -.001 .244 .065∗∗ .023
Black -.885∗∗ .240 -1.311∗∗ .310 -1.304∗∗ .310 -.054∗∗ .028
Married .521∗∗ .105 .733∗∗ .134 .732∗∗ .134 .015 .012
Has kids -.664∗∗ .102 -.925∗∗ .130 -.921∗∗ .130 -.042∗∗ .012
Years educ .227∗∗ .021 .278∗∗ .027 .277∗∗ .027 .016∗∗ .002
Tenure .070∗∗ .007 .106∗∗ .008 .106∗∗ .008
DB at old job .075 .241 .086 .303 .076 .303 .090∗∗ .030
DC at old job .524∗∗ .205 .621∗ .262 .603∗∗ .262 .239∗∗ .028
Provides match .727∗∗ .124 1.419∗∗ .162 1.415∗∗ .162
Log Networth .354∗∗ .025 .530∗∗ .033 .529∗∗ .033 .014∗∗ .003
Year 2004 .074 .118 .091 .150 .085 .150 .055∗∗ .014
Year 2007 -.703∗∗ .111 -1.118∗∗ .142 -1.122∗∗ .142 -.064∗∗ .014
Log Income -.302∗∗ .077 .193 .105 .170 .117 .274∗∗ .008
DC ratio 1.997∗ .078
Union Status -.210∗∗ .018
ρ .053 .043
N uncensored 12,757 12,757
N left-censored 3,941 3,941
N all 16,698 16,698 16,698 73,785
* Significantly different from 0 at .05 level.
** Significantly different from 0 at .01 level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
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Table 1.9: Predicted Conditional Contribution Rates∗ in 401(k) plans if All
401(k) Plans Provide an Employer Match
Least Squares Censored Regression Censored Regression
with Sample Selection
All 5.36% 4.59% 4.31%
Bottom Income Tercile 4.42% 3.30% 3.06%
Middle Income Tercile 5.20% 4.13% 3.80%
Top Income Tercile 6.27% 5.79% 5.46%
∗ Mean percent of salary contributed to 401(k) plan for workers participating in the plan.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
Table 1.10: Predicted Conditional Contribution Rates∗ in 401(k) plans if No
401(k) Plans Provide an Employer Match
Least Squares Censored Regression Censored Regression
with Sample Selection
All 4.67% 3.60% 3.28%
Bottom Income Tercile 3.77% 2.59% 2.32%
Middle Income Tercile 4.50% 3.11% 2.75%
Top Income Tercile 5.55% 4.50% 4.11%
∗ Mean percent of salary contributed to 401(k) plan for workers participating in the plan.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
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Chapter 2
Private Pensions and Wealth
Accumulation in a Dynamic
Model of Job Search and
Savings
2.1 Introduction
Standard labor theory suggests that workers self-select into jobs that offer a
mix of wage and non-wage benefits that best matches their preferences (see,
for example; Woodbury 1983). Moreover, the theory of equalizing differences
implies that otherwise identical employees, who receive higher non-wage bene-
fits will be paid a lower wage (Rosen 1987). Thus, controlling for productivity
and other characteristics affecting wages, one should expect to find a nega-
tive relationship between the wage and non-wage components of compensation
packages.
However, the empirical evidence on the existence of a compensating
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wage differential for pension benefits has been mixed. The results range from
a significant negative to a significant positive relationship between wages and
pensions.1 Most of the studies that address this question estimate the wage-
pension trade-off using a hedonic pension-earnings equation.2 Typically such
models have an earnings measure as a dependent variable and pension accruals
or promised benefits on the right-hand side. Thus, the lack of strong evidence
for a trade-off might be due to the implicit assumption that pension benefits
are exogenous.
Treating pensions as exogenous would fail to recognize that workers’
job search behavior determines simultaneously their wage and pension benefits.
Currently in the US not all employers offer pensions, and of those that do, most
offer just one pension plan.3 So, the worker cannot decide whether to enroll in
a pension plan nor what type of plan to have; he can only choose his employer
and enroll in the plan that it offers. In that respect, any job acceptance
decision is intertwined with the saving for retirement decision. When deciding
between job offers, the worker has to take into account how each offer will
affect his consumption today versus his ability to save for the future. An
observed positive correlation between wages and pensions could be simply
1Schiller and Weiss (1980), Ehrenberg (1980), Smith (1981) and, later, Montgomery
et al. (1992) and Gunderson et al. (1992) all find some evidence for the existence of a wage-
pension trade-off. On the contrary, Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) find no trade-off, but
rather a significantly positive relationship. Using an alternative benefit measure of pension
benefits, Inkmann (2006) finds empirical evidence for compensating wage differentials for
pension benefits provided by occupational DB and DC pension schemes in the UK.
2See a survey paper by Gustman et al. (1994).
3Decressin et al. (2005).
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due to the fact that more productive workers, who would also receive higher
wages, are the ones who are more risk averse and prefer to save through an
employer-provided channel. They consciously choose to work for employers
who offer pensions and thus end up with both a high wage and high pension
assets. Ignoring such type of unobserved selection would not only lead to
biased estimates when testing for the existence of a compensating differential
but would also prevent us from making reliable predictions on how changes
in the distribution or type of compensation packages would affect workers’
employment and retirement saving outcomes.
By modeling the trade-off that workers face when choosing between
compensation in the form of wages versus pension benefits, and by tracing out
the sorting mechanism that leads to the observed positive correlation between
wages and pensions in the data, this paper not only provides an implicit test
for the existence of a compensating differential but also provides a framework
within which we can assess the effect of counterfactual and policy experiments.
The question of interest is how will policies that change the distribution or
incentives of pension plans affect pension coverage and savings for retirement?
This is a policy relevant question, given the recent changes in the types
of pension plans being offered to the worker. Employer-provided pension plans
have traditionally been an important component of workers’ compensation in
the US.4 The type of pension coverage, however, has changed dramatically.
4For the past six decades, employer-provided pensions have been an important part of
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Pensions have shifted from traditional defined benefit (DB) plans to the now
dominant defined contribution (DC) plans.5 The new type of plans have in-
troduced new risks and incentives for retirement saving. While these plans
have the potential to provide substantial retirement income, in practice most
participants have only modest account balances – a trend which has lead to in-
creased concern about workers’ preparedness for retirement and has stimulated
debate on what kind of policies would encourage workers to save more.6
In this paper I suggest a new approach for addressing these questions,
which recognizes that the wage versus pension benefit decision is crucially
related to the job search and saving for retirement decision. I construct a
life cycle model in which individuals search for jobs, consume, and save on
their own and through their employer-provided pension in order to maximize
utility. Job offers are wage-pension packages, consisting of a wage component,
and a pension plan – DB, DC or no plan.7 Whenever the worker decides
whether to accept or reject a job offer he has to consider the trade-off between
the wage and pension components of that offer and how it compares with his
other alternatives. His decision will be the result of interplay between his
workers’ compensation and constituted a significant portion of retirees’ wealth in the US. For
today’s retirees, the employer-provided pension benefits are the second largest component
of retirement income. They are surpassed only by social security benefits, and are twice as
big as other forms of personal savings (Munnell and Perun 2006).
5For comparison in 1980, of all workers with pension coverage, only 40 percent had a
DC plan while 83 percent had a DB plan. In 2004, those numbers changed to 89 percent
and 39 percent, respectively (Munnell and Perun 2006).
6Munnell and Perun (2006)
7Defined benefit and defined contribution are currently the two major types of private
pension plans in the US (see Munnell and Perun 2006).
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preferences and the set of incentives and risks that each pension plan comes
with. Thus both wages and pensions are determined endogenously by the
worker’s job search process.
The model is designed to capture the main differences between the two
types of plans, as well as to account for the following stylized facts: 1) Positive
cross-sectional correlation between wages and pensions; pension coverage and
participation is more prevalent among high earners.8 2) Higher job mobility
among workers with DC plans, compared to those with DB plans.9
Consistent with the structure of private pension plans in the US, the
DB plan guarantees a lifetime income stream which is based on tenure and
pre-retirement earnings. In contrast, in the DC plan, the worker makes elec-
tive contributions to an account in which assets accumulate over time. The
employer also provides a matching contribution.
Three basic routes affect the way the worker substitutes between the
wage and pension components of job offers. These are: 1) generosity of the
plan; 2) uncertainty in rates of return; 3) tax incentives.
In an environment with no rate of return uncertainty, depending on the
generosity of the DB benefits and the match and contribution rates in the DC
plan, there exist equivalent wages which make the worker indifferent between
8Pension coverage is much more extensive for high-income households compared to the
low-income ones – around 85 percent of the households in the top two quintiles of the
income distribution have pensions, compared with a mere 28 percent for the bottom quintile
(Munnell and Perun 2006).
9See Munnell et al. (2006).
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choosing any of the three types of jobs. A no-pension but higher-wage job could
offer just as much expected lifetime utility as a DB or a DC-type job with a
lower wage. While in DB plans, the generosity is determined by the benefit
formula, in DC plans it depends on the availability of an employer match.10
Of course, this trade-off will not be the same for different workers. While
DC plans are easily portable across employers, DB plans are not. Combined
with the back-loaded nature of benefit accrual in DB plans, these plans are
more advantageous to workers who do not expect to change jobs often, or who
have already accumulated many years of tenure with their employer. Such
workers will be willing to trade-off even more in terms of current wages for
the availability of a DB plan. Thus we should expect to see that on average
older workers, as well as less mobile workers are more likely to have DB-type
plans as compared with DC-type plans or no pension plans. Consequently,
the model accommodates various forms of observed heterogeneity in order to
allow for differences in expected future offers and career paths to influence the
wage-pension and saving decisions.
Uncertainty in the rate of return adds an additional trade-off. In con-
trast to the DB plan which guarantees a specific benefit, the worker bears all
the investment risk on his DC and personal savings accounts. Thus, the more
10Because the worker is allowed to choose whether to contribute or not to his DC plan,
for the same wage and rate of return on assets, he would be indifferent between accepting
the DC-job or a no-pension job. The existence of an employer match, however, would make
the worker willing to trade-off a lower current wage for the DC-type job.
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risk averse the individual, the more willing he will be to substitute today’s
wages for tomorrow’s secure pension income and the more likely he will be
to accept a DB-type job.11 To capture this additional channel of workers’
behavior, the model allows for the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences, stemming from differences in risk aversion.
Tax incentives also add to the appeal of pension plans. Both employee’s
and employer’s contributions to DC plans are made out of pre-tax dollars.
Thus, for the same wage and rate of return on assets, tax incentives would
make the DC-type job preferable even in the absence of an employer match.
Moreover, the delayed taxation of pension benefits makes both DC and DB-
type jobs even more appealing as compared with the no-pension offers; due
to the progressive nature of the income tax law, even more so for high-wage
earners. In other words, the tax deferral on pension contributions and delayed
taxation of pension benefits would make workers willing to accept even lower
current wages for the availability of a DC or a DB-type of plan.
The model is estimated on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data via the method of indirect inference. The results provide no evidence for
the existence of a compensating differential – the estimates indicate positive
correlation between wages and pensions in the compensation packages that
employers offer even after controlling for unobservable selection on the part of
11In the model and estimation I have assumed the same rate of return on both DC and
non-pension assets. Thus, uncertainty in the rate of return does not add any additional
trade-offs between the no-pension and DC-type of job.
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the workers. The estimated structural parameters are used to address a set
of policy experiments: 1) A policy change which makes contributions to DC
plans mandatory for all workers with DC-type jobs results in a lower overall
pension coverage but an increase in average DC balance accumulations which
more than compensate the decrease in average non-pension savings. As a
result, workers approach retirement on average with as much as 10 percent
more overall assets. 2) A complete phaseout of DB plans from the job-offer
distribution leads to higher overall DC accumulations but lower overall savings
for retirement. 3) Eliminating the tax incentives on pension contributions leads
to lower pension coverage and lower DC accumulations, which are not fully
offset by an increase in non-pension savings.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Related literature
is reviewed next. Section 2.2 presents the dynamic job search model and the
solution approach. The main features of the data are presented in section
2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the estimation procedure. Section 2.5 presents the
results. Section 2.6 discusses policy experiments. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to two quite different strands of literature in labor eco-
nomics. On one hand, by modeling job offers as compensation packages, this
paper fits within the literature on search models that include job characteristics
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other than the offered wage. Some of the recent work in this field includes Blau
(1991) and Bloemen (2008), in which jobs are characterized by a combination
of a wage and number of working hours, and Dey and Flinn (2005); who focus
on wage and employer-provided health insurance. Similar to those papers,
this study models the job search decision in a structural dynamic framework
following workers’ job decisions over time. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first one to consider job offers as wage-pension packages and thus
contributes to the existing literature from a methodological standpoint.
On the other hand, this study is related to the growing literature that
studies retirement behavior, where dynamic discrete choice models have al-
ready seen numerous applications. Many authors have found the dynamic
modeling approach useful for explaining the consumption and employment
behavior of older workers – Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Blau (2008),
Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008). This paper uses a similar theoretical
framework to model the saving for retirement decision and the job choice and
employment decisions of workers at younger ages.
Finally, this chapter studies workers’ behavior when choosing between
jobs offering defined benefit plan versus those offering defined contribution
plan. As such, it falls among the broader literature on the benefits and risks
of DB and DC plans. Many studies in this area have already documented a
link between increased job mobility and the growing popularity of DC plans.
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Other papers have made comparisons of simulated retirement wealth under DB
and DC – Poterba et al. (2007), Samwick and Skinner (2006), and Schrager
(2009). This paper contributes to the understanding of the links between job
mobility, type of plan and retirement wealth by estimating a behavioral model
and performing counterfactual experiments on how changes in the pension
offer distribution affect job mobility and the distribution of retirement wealth.
2.2 Model
This section describes a dynamic stochastic model of employment and savings
decisions of an unmarried individual from a point in his life cycle when he is
first observed in the data to the end of the life cycle. Initial conditions are
those that exist at the time the individual is first observed and are addressed
in the solution and estimation sections.
2.2.1 Choice Set
The agent lives until age AT and is allowed to work till age AR − 1. From
the time he reaches age AR till AT , he is retired.12 During his working life,
at each discrete age a, the agent chooses consumption Ca, employment status
Ha (Ha = 1 if employed and Ha = 0 if unemployed). If the agent works
for an employer that offers a DC plan, he has the discrete choice whether to
12In the estimation, AT = 80 and AR = 66.
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contribute or not to that plan (da = 1 if he contributes, da = 0 if otherwise).
If at age a−1 the agent was employed, there is an exogenous probability
δ that the job gets destroyed and a probability λe that he will receive a new
job offer. He can experience the following transitions:
• If he is not laid off and receives a job offer, he can accept it and switch
to a new job or reject it and stay at his current job.
• If he is not laid off and does not receive a job offer, he has to remain on
his current job.
• If he is laid off, he remains unemployed for at least one period.
If at age a − 1 the agent was unemployed with probability λu, he will
receive a new job offer. He becomes employed if he receives and accepts a job
offer; otherwise he remains unemployed.
During retirement, the agent does not work, he simply consumes by
drawing down his pension and non-pension assets.
2.2.2 Preferences
The individual’s period utility is a function of consumption and employment
during his working life and a function of consumption during retirement. The
functional form assumed has the constant relative risk aversion property in
consumption and is separable in consumption and employment. I allow for
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unobserved heterogeneity in preferences through differences in risk aversion.13
ua =
C
2∑
j=1
1−σjI(type=j)
a − 1
1−
2∑
j=1
σjI(type = j)
exp(ca) + γHa +Ha
h
a if a < A
R (2.1)
ua =
C
2∑
j=1
1−σjI(type=j)
a − 1
1−
2∑
j=1
σjI(type = j)
if a ≥ AR,
where j denotes the person’s unobserved type, Ha = 1 if employed at age a,
and Ha = 0 otherwise; γ is the disutility of work. 
c
a and 
h
a are age-varying iid
shocks to the marginal utility of consumption and to the marginal disutility
of employment. There is no bequest motive.
2.2.3 Job Offer
Each new job offer is assumed to arrive randomly from a joint wage-pension
offer distribution, denoted by f(ω, p), and is characterized by an initial hourly
wage ω and a pension component p. The pension is modeled with a discrete
distribution where p = NP indicates no plan, p = DB indicates a defined
benefit plan and p = DC indicates a defined contribution plan.
13I allow for two types of individuals who differ in permanent features unobserved by the
econometrician. Besides different coefficients of risk aversion, the two types of individuals
have different intercepts in the wage component of the job offer distribution. This formu-
lation of unobserved heterogeneity is common in dynamic programming models (see e.g.
Wolpin (1984) and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008).
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The logarithm of the initial hourly wage offer is modelled as:
lnω =
2∑
j=1
βjI(type = j) + β3X + β4X
2 + β5E (2.2)
+β6I(p = DB) + β7I(p = DC) + ε
ω,
where εω is an iid mean-zero normal shock with variance σ2ω, X denotes years
of experience and E stands for education.14 This formulation accommodates
possible correlation between the offered wage, experience, education, and the
type of pension plan – all of those coming from the employer side, but in this
model, assumed to be exogenous.
2.2.4 Wage growth on the job
While on the job, the agent experiences wage growth due to specific human
capital accumulation. His current wage w(ω, k) depends on the initial wage
draw ω and the number of periods he has been working for the same employer
k. The wage growth function is:
w(ω, k) = ω exp(α1k + α2k
2) (2.3)
14To ease the computational burden, in the estimation I allow for two education cate-
gories: college graduate and high school/some college. In addition, because the data does
not provide information on experience, in the estimation, experience is approximated as a
function of “age - 12 - 6” for high school/some college category and “age - 16 - 6” for college
graduates.
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2.2.5 Pension Plans
Defined benefit
In a DB scheme, the employer pays the worker an annuity upon retirement
until his death that is a product of the generosity factor α, the employee’s
wage during his last year of employment, and the number of years the worker
has been at the firm. DB plans are assumed to vest in five years. The worker
is not entitled to any benefits if he leaves the firm with less than five years of
tenure. The DB benefit (which will be received during retirement), earned up
to date at current employer, is given by:15
dBa = αwaka if ka ≥ 5 (2.4)
dBa = 0 if ka < 5
DB benefits in the model accumulate from former employers. Let d˜Ba
denote all earned DB benefits from the individual’s former and current em-
ployers. In addition, it is assumed that once the worker dies, the firm does not
pay any additional benefits. This is equivalent to assuming that the worker is
single, because in reality most DB plans offer survivor benefits.16
15Even though in reality defined benefits are exposed to the risk of the employer going
bankrupt, the model does not allow for it. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a
government body that backstops retirees’ benefits when a company defined benefit pension
plan fails. It was created under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The
PBGC insurance program pays pension benefits up to the maximum guaranteed benefit set
by law to participants who retire at age 65 ($54,000 a year as of 2009).
16Around 94% of DB plans offer joint and survivor annuity for married participants (see
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Defined contribution
Each period while working for an employer who sponsors a DC plan, the
worker has the choice whether to contribute (da = 1) or not to (da = 0). If
he chooses to contribute, he contributes a fixed fraction of his wage ρ and the
firm matches at a fixed rate m.17 If he chooses not to contribute, the firm
does not either. The fractions ρ and m are assumed to be constant, known to
the agent and are not variables of choice. While working for a DC-providing
employer, the balance in the worker’s DC account accumulates according to:
DCa+1 = (D
C
a + da(ρ+m)wa)(1 + ra+1), (2.5)
where ra+1 is the rate of return on assets.
If the worker is not with a DC-providing employer but has had a DC
plan through a former employer, the account balance still accumulates with
the rate of return on assets:
DCa+1 = D
C
a (1 + ra+1) (2.6)
National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States,
2002-2003, U.S. Department of Labor).
17In reality, in most DC-type plans, the employee can choose how much to contribute and
the employer matches up to a certain percent. In addition, most DC plans have contribution
limits. For example, for 401(k) plans in 2009, the pre-tax employee contribution limit is
$16,500 for workers 50 or younger and $22,000 for workers over 50. The contribution limit
for employers is set at 6% of the employee’s pre-tax compensation.
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Borrowing from the account or withdrawals before retirement are not
allowed. When a worker leaves a DC-providing job, he carries his balance with
him.18 DC plans are assumed to vest immediately.19
2.2.6 Non-Pension Assets and Returns
Besides having pension assets, the worker is able to save on his own. The rate
of return on assets held at the end of period a, ra+1 is realized at the beginning
of period a+ 1.
The law of motion for non-pension assets is:
Aa+1 = A
∗
a(1 + ra+1), (2.7)
where A∗a is the stock of assets held at the end of a and Aa+1 is the stock at
the beginning of a+ 1.
There is a liquidity constraint, so that assets at the end of the period
cannot be negative, A∗a ≥ 0 and a consumption floor C min > 0. The liquidity
constraint prevents agents from borrowing against uncertain future income.
The rate of return is determined by a mean-reverting stochastic process
18In most DC plans, when leaving the firm, the worker could roll over the funds into a tax-
sheltered Individual Retirement Account (IRA), transfer the money to the new employer’s
plan or take a lump-sum payment at a penalty. Option 3 is excluded from the model, while
options 1 and 2 are considered equivalent.
19In DC plans, employee contributions always vest immediately. Employer contributions
must fully vest within three years, or six years if vesting occurs gradually. However, on
average vesting periods are shorter than in DB plans (see National Compensation Survey:
Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, 2002-2003, U.S. Department of
Labor).
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specified as:
ln(1 + ra+1) = ln(1 + r) + ξa , (2.8)
where r is the mean rate of return and ξa is an idiosyncratic individual specific
shock each period ξa ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ).20 Returns are defined to include capital
gains, which means that ra+1 can be less than zero, corresponding to a capital
loss.21 The same rate of return applies to both the DC pension account and
the individual’s other assets.22 The stochastic rate of return is necessary in
the model to capture the risk associated with saving on one’s own or through a
DC plan. In reality, the rate of return will depend on the investment portfolio.
Although portfolio choice is not explicitly modeled, the mean and variance
of the rate of return have been calibrated to match those of actual defined
contribution plans, using plan level data.23 In contrast, in DB plans, the
investment risk is completely borne by the employer.
Taxes and the budget constraint
Under current law, pension benefits are taxed at withdrawal. In this model,
this happens during retirement for both DB and DC plans. In addition, income
20There is no aggregate uncertainty.
21This specification is also used in Blau (2008).
22The assumption is that the worker and the firm have access to the same asset markets.
In that respect, given a certain wage offer, the only incentives for accepting a DC-type job
come from the tax deferral and the employer match – not because the employer is better at
managing the worker’s investments.
23Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. 5500-CRR data: Panel of Current
and Usable Form 5500 Data.
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taxes are deferred on both employee and employer contributions to DC plans,
and returns accrue tax-free during the individual’s working life.24 The progres-
sive nature of income tax law provides an additional incentive for contributing
to DC plans for high-income workers as compared with the low-income group.25
By τa(wa, raA
∗
a−1, da) I denote taxes paid at age a which include federal income
and payroll taxes, calculated using the rules in effect in 2006 and assuming
individuals take the standard deduction. Taxes are a function of earnings and
income which in term depend on the individual’s decision to contribute or not
to a DC plan.
The budget constraint can be written as:
If unemployed:
Ca = Aa − A∗a + ba − τa, (2.9)
where ba includes non-labor income, like family transfers and unemployment
compensation net of out-of-pocket search costs.
If employed:
Ca = Aa − A∗a + (1− I(p = DC)ρda)wa − τa (2.10)
24Roth IRAs are an exception. Under a Roth IRA, individuals, whether employed or self-
employed, voluntarily contribute post-tax funds to an individual retirement account (IRA).
In contrast to the 401(k) plan, the Roth plan requires post-tax contributions, but allows for
tax-free growth and distribution.
25Both employee’s and employer’s contributions to DC are exempt from income taxes.
However, the employee still owes Social Security and Medicare taxes on his total pre-
contribution earnings.
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If retired:
Ca = Aa − A∗a +DCa −DC∗a + d˜Ba − τa (2.11)
Aa+1 = A
∗
a(1 + r)
DCa+1 = D
C∗
a (1 + r)
In retirement, there is no uncertainty either in terms of rate of return
(which is held at its’ mean value) nor in terms of life-expectancy; the agent
simply withdraws his pension and non-pension assets.26
2.2.7 The Agent’s Dynamic Programming Problem
At each age, given his employment status and his current assets (non-pension
assets Aa, defined contribution account balance D
C
a and earned annual defined
benefit d˜Ba ), the agent decides his employment status, whether to contribute
or not if he has a DC plan, and his consumption or, equivalently, his level
of assets at the end of period a, A∗a. Initial assets are inherited. The agent’s
problem can be characterized recursively by three Bellman equations.
During retirement, there is no uncertainty. The agent faces a fixed rate
of return, receives income from his DB plans (if he had any) and draws down
26The problem reverts to a non-stochastic cake-eating problem. These assumptions can
be relaxed but are not essential to the model, first because the focus is on saving decisions of
workers at younger ages, and second, at the point of retirement the individual could convert
his assets to an annuity to insure himself.
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his DC account and his own financial assets. The present discounted value of
utility of a retired agent at age a, V Ra , can be expressed as:
V Ra (Aa, D
C
a , d˜
B
a ) = max
A∗a,DC∗a
{u(Ca) + β[V Ra+1(Aa+1, DCa+1, d˜Ba+1)|Aa, DCa , d˜Ba ]}
subject to:
Ca = Aa − A∗a +DCa −DC∗a + d˜Ba − τa
Ca > C min
A∗a ≥ 0
DC∗a ≥ 0
Aa+1 = A
∗
a(1 + r)
DCa+1 = D
C∗
a (1 + r)
During his working life, the agent chooses whether to work or not, and
also chooses between jobs. The value of unemployment at age a depends on
pension and non-pension asset holdings, earned defined benefits and the vector
of utility shocks, which we can denote as a = {ca, ha} :
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V ua (Aa, D
C
a , d˜
B
a , a) = max
Ca
{ua(Ca, 0, a)
+β[λu
∫ ∫ ∫
max[V ea+1(Aa+1, D
C
a+1, d˜
B
a+1, x, y, 0, a+1),
V ua+1(Aa+1, D
C
a+1, d˜
B
a+1, a+1)]dF (x, y)dFr(r)dF()
+(1− λu) ∫ ∫ V ua+1(Aa+1, DCa+1, d˜Ba+1, a+1)dFr(r)dF()]}
subject to:
Ca = Aa + b− A∗a − τa
Ca > C min
A∗a ≥ 0
Aa+1 = A
∗
a(1 + ra+1)
The Bellman equation for an employed worker with asset holdings at the
beginning of a, after the realization of the rate of return shock, (Aa, D
C
a , d˜
B
a ),
who works at a firm offering initial wage ω and pension type p and has ka
years of tenure is:
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V ea (Aa, D
C
a , d˜
B
a , ω, p, ka, a) = max
Ca,da∈{0,1}
{ua(Ca, 1, a)
+β(1− δ)λe ∫ ∫ ∫ max[V ea+1(Aa+1, DCa+1, d˜Ba+1, x, y, 0, a+1),
V ea+1(Aa+1, D
C
a+1, d˜
B
a+1, ω, p, ka+1, a+1)]dF (x, y)dFr(r)dF()
+β(1− δ)(1− λe)∗
∗ ∫ ∫ V ea+1(Aa+1, DCa+1, d˜Ba+1, ω, p, ka+1, a+1)dFr(r)dF()
+βδ
∫ ∫
V ua+1(Aa+1, D
C
a+1, d˜
B
a+1)dFr(r)dF()
subject to:
Ca = Aa + (1− I(p = DC)ρda)wa − τa − A∗a
Ca > C min
A∗a ≥ 0
Aa+1 = A
∗
a(1 + ra+1)
2.2.8 Solution Method
The model is numerically solved by backward recursion. Because the state
space includes continuous variables, e.g., the current level of the worker’s non-
pension and pension assets, it is not possible to obtain exact solutions. Instead,
I adopt an approximation technique similar to Keane and Wolpin (1994) and
Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008). At each given point in the state space,
the individual decides between jobs and on consumption so as to maximize
total lifetime utility. For any given value of the deterministic and stochastic
components of the state space, and for each of the possible choices of employ-
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ment status, the agent optimizes with respect to consumption and the decision
to contribute or not to the DC plan, taking into account the lower bound on
assets and the consumption floor. The level of consumption and the contri-
bution decision that maximize total utility are chosen for that value of the
state space. At any deterministic state point, the expected value of maximal
terminal utility is obtained by Monte Carlo integration. This expectation is
calculated at a subset of the deterministic state points and the function is ap-
proximated for all other state points by linear interpolation.27 This procedure
is repeated from AT to the initial age.
2.3 Data
This study uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) as the primary
source of data. The PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Sur-
vey Research Center at the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan. Beginning in 1968, the study followed the same set of households,
emphasizing the dynamic aspects of their economic and demographic behav-
ior. As of 2005, the sample size consists of almost 8000 households. The PSID
is the preferred data in comparison to other datasets that also provide wage
and pension data, because it allows the study of the wage-pension trade-off
27Future versions of the paper will try other approximation methods as well, such as a
quadratic or cubic spline. I use 20 draws for the Monte Carlo integration and around 20,000
state points for the approximation.
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for workers at different stages of their life cycle. Unlike the Health and Retire-
ment Study, where the majority of the individuals are in the later phases of
their working lives, the PSID reports the job market and savings decisions of
individuals of all ages. Although in the past the pension data from the PSID
has been somewhat limited, in 1999 a new section introduced detailed ques-
tions on pension participation, eligibility, type and number of plans, percent
of worker and employer contributions and account balances. In addition, the
PSID contains detailed information on other variables that enter the estima-
tion, such as sociodemographic characteristics, education, employment status,
income and wealth. So far, the 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 waves with
detailed pension sections have been released.28
2.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample is designed to be relatively homogeneous with respect to a number
of demographic characteristics. In particular, it includes only white males with
at least high school education, who are between the ages of 26 and 55 for at
least two waves of the data. In addition, any individual who reports attendance
in school, self-employment, military service or participation in any government
welfare program (i.e., AFDC, WIC or food stamps) over the sample period is
excluded. Although the format of the PSID data makes the task of defining
28The current draft of the paper presents results from estimation based on the 1999
through 2005 waves of the PSID. An updated version of the paper will include the 2007
wave as well.
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job changes somewhat difficult,29 in other respects the survey information is
well-suited to the requirements of this analysis since it follows individuals for
up to six years and includes data on both earnings, employment and type of
pension plans held during the observation period. The sample size is 3,429 with
9,689 person-year observations. I define employment as working (35+ hours
per week) year round (36+ weeks per year) or the equivalent of 1,260 hours.
The annual earnings of individuals who were employed by this definition is
the earnings measure. Non-pension assets are measured by the reported total
net worth of the individual less DC accumulations and IRA accounts. In the
estimation DC values include IRA accounts. All dollar amounts are inflated
by the Consumer Price Index to 2006 dollars.
The generosity factor for DB pension, the contribution and match rate
for DC pensions were chosen to be representative of the most popular pension
plans in the US.30 The rate of return on DC assets was estimated from the
5500 plan-level data using actual return on DC investments for the period
1988-2006.
The average age of the sample is 42 years and roughly 83 percent of the
workers are employed. Current job tenure is 9.3 years. It is lower for work-
ers who are currently at employers that don’t provide pensions – 5.7 years,
compared with 10.9 years for those who are at a pension-providing employer.
29Since 1997 the interviews are done every couple of years.
30See the National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the
United States, 2002-2003, U.S. Department of Labor.
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Job tenure is highest for workers with DB plans, 13.5 years compared with
9.6 years for workers with DC plans. This observation is consistent with the
back-loaded nature of benefit accruals in DB plans, providing an incentive for
workers to stay longer with their employer. The incentive in DC plans comes
from the employer match, the tax deferral on contributions and returns, and
rising wages with tenure. Still, because these plans are more portable across
employers, one would expect average tenure in these jobs to be lower as com-
pared with DB-type jobs, and that is indeed what the data shows. Moreover,
the data suggest a positive relationship between earnings and pension cover-
age. Average annual earnings are $6,700 higher at jobs with pension coverage
as compared with jobs without. In addition, workers at employers who offer
a DB-type plan earn on average $1,200 more than workers with DC plans.
Table 2.1 summarizes the statistics. These numbers, however, do not show us
what the underlying reason is for the positive correlation between wages and
pensions. One possibility is that job offers that include a pension plan, have a
higher wage component as well. Another possibility is that high-productivity
workers are more risk-averse and self-select into jobs with pension plans. The
estimates of the model help disentangle these two effects.
Table 2.2 compares overall pension coverage by type of plan and age.
Roughly 70 percent of employed workers are currently with an employer who
offers a plan. In the sample, this percent slightly decreases with age. It is
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Table 2.1: Sample Statistics
No pension Pension Plan If Pension Plan
at current at current
employer: employer: DC plan DB plan
% of workers with 31.5 69.5 65.9 34.1
Mean current job tenure 5.7 10.9 9.6 13.5
(years)
Mean annual earnings $55,342 $62,069 $61,672 $62,838
interesting to note that of those with plans, younger workers are more likely
to have a DC versus a DB plan, and the opposite is true for older workers.31
On average, 66 percent of all jobs with pensions offer DC plans and 34 percent
offer DB plans.
2.4 Estimation
Estimating the behavioral model presents two challenges. The fist one arises
from the fact that the PSID samples people of all ages, hence the decisions ob-
served for the majority of the people, do not start at the beginning of their life
31There are two potential explanations for this observation. One is related to the pension
type shift and captures cohort effects: DB plans were more popular in the past, and with
tenure rising with age, we would expect to see older workers today more likely to be still in
DB-type jobs. The other explanation has to do with risk aversion and liquidity constraints
– younger workers move between jobs more often and are more liquidity constrained, so
they would prefer DC-type plans, while older workers might be more risk-averse and prefer
the DB option. The setup of the model does not allow us to isolate the cohort effects.
Ideally, one would like to make the pension component of the job offer distribution depend
on time or birth cohort. Unfortunately, that is very computationally burdensome because it
introduces another state variable that takes on many values. This is left for future research.
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Table 2.2: Sample Statistics: Pension Coverage by Type and Age
% working for an % with DC plan % with DB plan
employer who if working for an if working for an
offers pensions employer who employer who
offers pensions offers pensions
Age
26-35 71.5 69.6 30.4
36-45 69.3 65.3 34.7
46-55 68.3 64.0 36.0
cycles but at some later period and are thus conditioned on state variables that
arise from prior unobserved decisions. Direct estimation will lead to inconsis-
tent estimates if those “initial” conditions are not exogenous – that is, if there
is unobserved heterogeneity in preferences or constraints. In the estimation
this problem is addressed by assuming that the probabilities of the unobserved
heterogeneity types can be represented by parametric functions of the initial
state variables. If the shocks are serially independent, then the initial state
variables will be exogenous given type.32 The second problem arises due to
the biennial nature of the PSID – some of the state variables are missing every
other year. This problem is harder to solve with a likelihood-based estimation
approach. It would require integrating over the distribution of the missing
state variables. Because the missing observations include elements of the state
32For a discussion of the initial conditions problem and possible solutions, see Aguirre-
gabiria and Mira (2009)
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space that take on many values (e.g., assets are treated as continuous), this
approach poses a huge computational burden.
I therefore pursue a non-likelihood-based estimation strategy, efficient
method of moments, henceforth EMM, which is a type of indirect inference (see
Gallant and Tauchen 1996, Gourieroux and Monfort 1996, Smith 1993). EMM
is a generalization of the method of simulated moments. It is particularly use-
ful when a model is not analytically tractable, but can be easily simulated.
The basic idea is to find a set of structural parameters that minimize the
distance between a set of moments from the data and the model-predicted
counterparts of these moments based on simulated data from the structural
model. The set of the moments that are matched can be viewed as a set of
auxiliary parameters from a set of auxiliary statistical models. These auxiliary
models can be structural or reduced form, and they should provide a complete
enough statistical description of the data and simulations to be able to identify
the behavioral parameters. Following Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), I
use a combination of approximate decision rules (that link endogenous out-
comes of the model and elements of the state space) and modified structural
relationships (such as the wage equations).
More specifically, using actual data, yA , I estimate a set of MA aux-
iliary statistical relationships with parameters θA. By construction, at the
maximum likelihood estimates θ̂A, the scores of the likelihood function (Lj for
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j = 1, ...,MA) are zero. That is,
∂Lj
∂θA,j
= 0 where θA,j is the vector of model
j’s parameters. Denoting θB the parameters of the behavioral model, the idea
of EMM is to choose parameters that generate simulated data (yB(θB)) that
make the score functions as close to zero as possible. This is accomplished by
minimizing the weighted squared deviations of the score functions evaluated
at the simulated data. The EMM estimator of θB is thus:
θ̂B = arg min
θB
∂L
∂θA
(yB(θB); θ̂A)Λ
∂L
∂θ′A
(yB(θB); θ̂A) , (2.12)
where Λ is a weighting matrix and ∂L
∂θA
(yB(θB); θ̂A) is a vector collecting the
scores of the likelihood functions across auxiliary models. When MA = 1,
the optimal weighting matrix is the inverse Hessian and has a limiting normal
distribution.33 For tractability, I estimate MA auxiliary models separately and
choose as a weighting matrix a block diagonal matrix Λ∗ such that each block
is a consistent estimate of the inverse Hessian of the corresponding auxiliary
model evaluated at the actual data. The estimator is consistent when the
number of simulated observations grows proportionately with the number of
actual observations as the latter goes to infinity.
33See Gourieroux et al. (1993).
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2.4.1 The Auxiliary Statistical Models
The solution of the optimization problem of section 2 is a set of decision
rules in which the optimal choice made in any decision period is a function of
the state space in that period. Parametric approximations to these decision
rules will serve as one class of auxiliary models to be used in the estimation.
Following Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), to keep these approximations
parsimonious (as to preserve precision in the parameter estimates), I do not
include all the state variables as suggested by the theory, and for that reason it
is best to think of them as “restricted” approximate decision rules. A second
set of auxiliary models comprises quasi-structural relationships related to the
wage equation.
The specific type of parametric approximation adopted depends on
whether the choice and state variables are discrete or continuous. The fol-
lowing list consists of auxiliary models used in estimation:
1. Logits of unemployment versus employment on combinations of experi-
ence, education, tenure, lagged net worth and lagged DC balance.
2. Logits of unemployment to employment transitions on combinations of
experience, education, tenure, lagged net worth and lagged DC balance.
3. Logits of job-to-job transitions on experience, education, tenure, current
and lagged pension type, lagged DC assets and lagged net worth.
67
4. Multinomial logits of work in job without pension, job with DB, job with
DC pension on combinations of experience, education, tenure, lagged
employment status, lagged DC balance and lagged net worth.
5. Multinomial logits of unemployment, work in job without pension, job
with DB, job with DC pension on combinations of experience, education,
tenure, lagged employment status, lagged DC balance and lagged net
worth.
6. Logits of contribution versus non-contribution for workers in DC plans
on experience, education, wage, tenure, lagged DC balance and lagged
net worth.
7. Regressions of net assets on age, lagged net worth, lagged employment
status, lagged pension status and lagged DC balance.
8. Regressions of log wages on experience, education, lagged log wage,
tenure and DB/DC dummies.
9. Regression of within job wage growth on tenure.
Currently in the estimation, 149 score functions are used to identify 25
parameters of interest.
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2.4.2 Simulating the Data for Estimation
I perform path simulations in the following way. For each trial value of the
structural parameters, and having solved the optimization problem, simulat-
ing one-step-ahead decisions is straightforward if all the state variables are
observed. For example, consider a hypothetical individual who is 30 years old
in 1999 and who is observed for seven 12-month periods, i.e., through age 36.
Given the state variables at his 1999 interview, a simulation of the decision at
age 30 for that individual would be obtained by drawing a vector of the distur-
bances and choosing the alternative with the highest value function. Similar
simulations can be obtained at ages 31-36 based on the actual state variables.
However, because of the biennial nature of the data, many state variables are
missing every other year. So the actual state variables are used only for 1999,
2001, 2003 and 2005. For 2000, the state variables are derived by updating
the 1999 state variables by the 1999 decisions. Similarly, the 2002 and 2004
state variables are the result of the 2001 and 2003 decisions.
The unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated in the following way. The
probability that a simulated individual is of a given type depends on his initial
state variables. Given that probability, each simulated observation is assigned
the particular type by drawing randomly from the type probability function.
Having simulated the data, the criterion function (2.12) is calculated for
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each of the auxiliary models.34 I iterate on the parameters using the Newuoa
derivative-free optimization algorithm (Powell 2008) until the sum over the
auxiliary models of (2.12) is minimized. The parameters of interest include
the parameters of the job offer distribution, the wage-growth function, the
utility function and the type probability function.
2.4.3 Identification
Identification is achieved through variation in individual outcomes and choices,
embedded constraints and parametric assumptions. A common identification
difficulty of job search models is to separately identify the job offer rates from
the parameters of the utility function.35 Because only accepted job offers are
observed, the econometrician could not distinguish between the individual’s
decision not to work being the result of receiving a job offer that is below
his reservation utility or not receiving an offer this period. In this particular
version of the model, identification is solved by assuming fixed offer and lay-
off rates, which are not part of the estimation.36 The observed employment
choices (and the type of pension plans at those jobs) help identify the pa-
34For the purpose of calculating the score function, I perform 20 simulations for each
sample observation.
35Except for cases where the incidence of job offers is observed in the data.
36These assumptions can be relaxed in future versions of the paper. Even though the
reasons for leaving a job are not observed in the PSID, the setup of the model allows for the
identification of layoff rates from the observed transitions of employment to unemployment.
As regards the offer rates, in general, the identification would be achieved through informa-
tion on transition rates of unemployment to employment, functional form assumptions on
the wage distribution and the reservation utility property.
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rameters in the disutility of work and the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Risk-averse individuals do not like fluctuations in consumption. Hence, the
coefficient of risk aversion is identified by the degree to which workers make
choices as to smooth consumption. In the model this can be achieved through
two channels – employment decision and precautionary savings. Employment,
particularly at pension-offering jobs, will be more valuable to risk-averse in-
dividuals (given the same wage, DB plans are more attractive than DC plans
because of zero investment risk). In addition, for the same type of pension plan
at the current employer, variations in non-pension saving and the incidence of
contributions to DC plans bring further information for the identification of
the risk-aversion parameter.37
The main goal of the estimation is to find the parameters of the utility
function and the job offer distribution, in order to uncover the mechanism
that leads to the observed positive correlation between labor earnings and
pension coverage in the data. If there are unobserved permanent differences
between workers that make some workers more productive (hence get higher
wage offers) and at the same time more risk averse (hence prefer pension-
type jobs), they will self-select into jobs with high wages and pension plans.
Ignoring this permanent component to the unobserved shock in the wage part
37The identification of the coefficient of risk aversion is facilitated also by the assumption
of a common discount factor, which is taken as a given. Thus, variations in saving outcomes
across individuals is attributed solely to differences in observable characteristics and the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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of the job offer (2.2) will lead to bias in the other estimates of the wage
equation and make us wrongly conclude that the positive correlation is solely
due to the lack of compensating wage differential in the job offer. Thus, the
unobserved heterogeneity in the model serves another purpose besides solving
the initial conditions problem. In the estimation, I allow for two latent type
of workers that permanently differ in risk aversion and in the intercept of
the wage equation. Identification of the type proportions is achieved through
across-group variation in wages and asset accumulations.
2.5 Results
In this section, I present results from the estimation of the model described in
section 2.2 and using data from the 1999 to 2005 waves of the PSID.
2.5.1 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates are provided in tables 2.3 and 2.4. With respect to the job
offer distribution, wage offers peak at 28 years of experience. College graduates
have on average 40 percent higher wage offers. Jobs that offer DC plans tend
to offer wages that are 19.3 percent higher than no-pension jobs. Jobs that
come with DB plans offer wages that are 25.6 percent higher as compared with
no-pension jobs. The estimates of the discrete part of the job offer distribution
imply that the probability of receiving an offer with no pension is 40.1 percent,
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Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates: Job Offer
Log Wage Equation
Unobserved Type 1 intercept 2.17
Unobserved Type 2 intercept 2.86
Experience 0.0398
Experience2 -0.00072
College Graduate 0.401
DB-type offer 0.256
DC-type offer 0.193
Standard error of wage shock 0.689
Pension Offer
Prob DB plan 0.189
Prob DC plan 0.410
Wage Growth on Job
Tenure 0.029
Tenure2 -0.00036
an offer with a DC-type pension is 41 percent and 18.9 percent for a DB-type
offer. While on the job, wages tend to increase with tenure, but at a decreasing
rate, and peak at 41 years.
The estimates also point to considerable differences between the two
unobserved types of individuals that were modeled. Everything else held con-
stant, Type 2 individuals receive on average wage offers that are almost twice
as high as that of Type 1 individuals. With respect to preferences, Type 1
individuals are less risk averse than Type 2 individuals. The coefficients of
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Table 2.4: Parameter Estimates: Utility Function
Coefficient of relative 0.81
risk aversion (type1)
Coefficient of relative 1.69
risk aversion (type 2)
Disutility from work -0.003
St error employment shock 0.289
St error consumption shock 0.177
relative risk aversion are estimated to be 0.81 and 1.69, respectively. These
numbers fall within the range of other findings in the literature.38 The disu-
tility of work is found to be -0.003. The calibrated values of the parameters
held fixed in estimation can be found in Table 2.12 in the appendix.
Overall, the estimates are consistent with both of the potential expla-
nations for the positive correlation between wages and pensions observed in
the data. On one hand, pension-type jobs come on average with higher wage
offers, so one would expect in the cross-section to observe workers with pension
coverage to have higher earnings as well – thus no evidence for the existence of
a compensating differential between wages and pensions has been found. On
the other hand, the estimates suggest two distinct types of unobserved hetero-
geneity in terms of risk aversion. Given the savings incentives provided with
two types of pension plans, one would expect the more risk-averse individuals
38Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) report estimates of 1.68 and 1.59; Rendon (2006)
reports an estimate of 1.48.
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to sort into jobs with pensions and stay there longer. Moreover, the more
risk-averse individuals have on average higher wage offers, which also leads to
a positive relationship between earnings and pension coverage.
2.5.2 Model Fit
Tables 2.5-2.8 provide evidence on the within-sample fit as well as demon-
strating other characteristics of the model. The model predictions are based
on a simulated sample, consisting of 20 replicas for each sample individual.
The central feature of the model is how individuals choose between jobs based
on the wage and pension characteristics. Thus, the model should fit well the
pension coverage trends in the data, as well as tenure and earning by types of
plans.
Table 2.5 reports pension coverage (defined as currently at a job that
offers a pension) by type and age. Roughly 70 percent of workers in the sample
currently work for an employer that offers pensions. The model follows this
number relatively closely. Of those who are at a pension job, roughly 70
percent are at a DC-type job and 30 percent are at a DB-type job. Younger
workers are more likely to be at a DC-type job compared with older workers,
who are more likely to be at a DB-type job. This trend is matched by the
model as well, however, the model slightly overpredicts the percent of workers
at DC jobs and underpredicts the percent of workers at DB type jobs. This
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could be due to cohort effects, which the model is not able to capture.
Table 2.5: Model Fit: Actual and Predicted Pension Coverage, by Age
% working for an % with DC plan if % with DB plan if
employer who working for an working for an
offers pension employer who employer who
offers pension offers pension
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
26-35 71.5 68.0 69.6 72.7 30.4 27.3
36-45 69.3 70.0 65.3 69.4 34.7 30.1
46-55 68.4 70.5 64.0 66.4 36.0 34.0
Table 2.6: Model Fit: Actual and Predicted Average Tenure, by Pension
Coverage and Age
Tenure if no Tenure if Tenure if DC plan Tenure if DB plan
pension coverage pension coverage at current at current
at current at current employer employer
employer employer
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
26-35 4.1 4.2 5.8 5.3 5.4 5.0 6.7 6.0
36-45 5.6 6.1 10.6 9.6 9.5 8.5 12.7 12.1
46-55 6.9 6.9 14.9 13.4 12.9 11.5 18.4 17.3
Table 2.6 compares actual and predicted statistics for mean tenure at
current job, by age and pension coverage. The model closely tracks average
tenure by age groups. Average tenure rises with age for all categories, but
especially for workers currently with a DB plan. Average tenure at no-pension
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Table 2.7: Model Fit: Actual and Predicted Average Annual Earnings, by
Pension Coverage and Age
Annual earnings Annual earnings Annual earnings Annual earnings
if no pension if pension if DC plan at if DB plan at
coverage at at coverage current employer current employer
current employer current employer
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
26-35 $46,037 $42,354 $50,778 $48,788 $51,010 $49,122 $50,247 $47,899
36-45 $54,741 $54,813 $64,742 $64,815 $65,434 $64,835 $63,442 $64,769
46-55 $61,671 $59,702 $67,454 $69,571 $66,088 $69,494 $69,883 $69,724
Table 2.8: Selected Characteristics by Type
Type 1 Type 2
Proportion 38.3 61.7
% employed 87.4 83.6
% no pension if employed 47.2 33.0
% DC plan if employed with pension 72.2 67.6
% DB plan if employed with pension 27.8 32.4
Average tenure if no pension 5.4 6.4
Average tenure if DC plan 6.2 10.0
Average tenure if DB plan 7.5 15.1
% contributing of those with DC plan 78.5 57.4
Average earnings $46,564 $68,195
Average DC assets at age 55 $38,000 $99,371
Average non-pension assets at age 55 $158,404 $167,833
jobs is lower than at pension jobs for all age groups. The model is successful
in replicating this trend. Both the data and the prediction show that average
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tenure is much higher at DB-type jobs as compared with DC and no-pension
jobs.
Table 2.7 presents actual and predicted statistics for annual earnings by
age and pension coverage at current job. The model captures the concave re-
lationship between earnings and age. Moreover, as was previously noted,there
exists a positive correlation between earnings and pension coverage in the data.
The model captures this trend both qualitatively and quantitatively. For all
age groups, earnings at no-pension jobs are lower than earnings at pension-
offering jobs. In addition, workers in the first two age categories, currently
with DC plans, earn on average more than workers with DB plans. For the
highest age group, the reverse is true – DB-type jobs are associated with higher
earnings. The model captures the trend but overpredicts earnings at DC-type
jobs by 4.5 percent.
Although not specifically related to the model fit, Table 2.8 highlights
the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. The estimates
show that 38 percent of the individuals in the sample are Type 1 and 62 percent
are of Type 2. Type 2 workers are more risk-averse and more productive –
they tend to get higher wage offers, everything else held constant. On average,
Type 2 workers earn 46.5 percent more annually than Type 1 workers. Because
of higher risk aversion and the desire to smooth consumption, these type of
workers self-select into jobs that offer pension plans. Table 2.8 shows that
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while 47.2 percent of Type 1 workers have no pension at their current job,
this number is only 33 percent for Type 2 workers. Moreover, because DB
plans don’t have investment risk, Type 2 workers are more likely than Type 1
workers to choose a DB-type job. As Table 2.8 reports, among workers with
a pension, 32.4 percent of Type 2 workers work for a DB-providing employer,
compared with 27.8 percent of Type 1 workers. In addition, the more risk-
averse individuals tend to stay longer at their current job. Average tenure
for these workers – in all non-pension, DB and DC-type jobs is much higher
than average tenure for the less risk-averse types. Positive returns to tenure
further contribute to their relatively higher earnings. As a result of higher risk
aversion, a higher wage offer, longer tenure and a higher probability of choosing
a pension-type job, Type 2 individuals approach their retirement years with 6
percent more non-pension assets but as much as 160 percent more DC assets
as compared with Type 2 individuals.
2.6 Policy Experiments
One of the goals of this paper is to determine how policy changes will impact
workers’ job choice decisions and thus determine their earnings and saving for
retirement outcomes. The estimates indicate two underlying factors behind the
observed higher pension coverage and higher pension assets among the high
earners as compared with low earners in the data. On the one hand, a positive
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correlation between the wage and pension components of the job offers coming
from the employer side suggests the existence of “good” and “bad” jobs – those
that provide both a high salary and a pension and those that provide neither.
On the other hand, there is positive sorting among workers in the sense that
more productive workers, who on average receive higher wage offers, are also
more risk averse and as a way to smooth consumption prefer to go to jobs that
offer pension plans.39
In this section, I use the estimates of the model to see how changes in
the types and incentives of the two pension plans will affect workers outcomes.
I simulate histories of 10,000 artificial agents using the estimated structural
parameters. Each agent begins life at age 26, at which time he is randomly
assigned employment status, tenure, wage, pension and non-pension assets,
all chosen so as to match the proportions observed in the data. At age 26,
each worker is also assigned an unobserved type by drawing from the type
distribution. Each period from age 26 to 66, the agent receives a draw from
the distribution of the disturbances and makes optimal employment, job and
savings choices. The choices he makes determine the values of the state vari-
ables at the end of the period, which are passed forward to the next period.
The process repeats until the individual reaches retirement at age 66. From
39It is worth highlighting the partial equilibrium setup of the model. As such, the demand
side of the labor market is considered completely exogenous. When interpreting the results,
as well as the policy experiments, one has to keep in mind the underlying assumption that
in the model, the employers are not allowed to adjust their behavior. The effects that we
are witnessing show solely how workers adjust their behavior to changes in the environment.
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age 66 to 80, the agent just consumes his pension and non-pension assets and
faces no uncertainty. These simulations provide the benchmark against which
I compare the policy experiments.
2.6.1 Mandatory Contribution in DC plans
The first policy experiment is motivated by the recent literature on the effect of
defaults on savings outcomes in respect to defined contribution pension plans.
These studies have pointed out the failure of eligible workers to join the plan
or contribute as two of the reasons why the majority of households in the U.S.
enter retirement with only modest DC balances.40 Currently, most companies
in the U.S. offering DC-type plans require active election on the part of em-
ployees to participate and contribute. That is, if the employee does nothing,
the default is that he will not be enrolled in the plan (“standard enrollment”).
An alternative but less widely used approach is to enroll employees automati-
cally in the plan, requiring them to actively opt out of participation. Previous
studies have indicated that even such a simple change in the default can have
drastic impact on participation and savings outcomes.41
In light of the model in this paper, I conduct a policy experiment that
takes the automatic enrollment provision to an extreme and imposes manda-
tory contributions for workers who are currently with an employer who offers
40Munnell and Sunden (2006).
41For a detailed overview on the effects of default options in DC plans, see Beshears et al.
(2006).
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a DC plan. The percent contribution and the employer match rate are held
fixed at 6 and 3 percent of earnings, respectively (and as discussed in the
model). What is of interest is the effect on workers’ pension coverage, and
savings outcomes due to this policy change.42
Instituting mandatory contributions in DC plans will make them less
attractive to workers who might have otherwise chosen not to contribute –
either because of liquidity constraints or lower risk aversion. This will raise
the relative attractiveness of non-pension and DB jobs. Indeed, overall pension
coverage drops from 68.7 percent to 67.4 percent – caused by a decrease in the
percent of workers at DC-type jobs (from 69.8 percent to 68.8 percent), which
cannot be fully compensated by the increase in the percent of workers at DB-
type jobs (30.1 percent to 31.2 percent).
Table 2.9 shows the effect of mandatory contributions on non-pension
and DC balances. Across all age groups, we observe an increase in accumu-
lated DC balances due to the mandatory nature of contributions and because
the drop in DC coverage is too small to have significant effects on overall ac-
cumulations. The increase in DC account balances varies from 30 percent for
the youngest age group to more than 60 percent for the oldest. At the same
time, workers compensate with saving less on their own. The drop in mean
42It should be noted that given the current model, in which agents behave optimally, such
a policy change, which eliminates one of the choices, previously available to workers, will
necessarily result in a welfare loss. The question of what would make workers not behave
optimally in the first place and thus justify such a policy change is beyond the scope of this
paper and is left for future research.
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non-pension assets varies from 18 to 5 percent from the youngest to oldest.
Overall, mandatory contributions have caused an increase of $27,700 in total
assets (or an equivalent of 10 percent) for the group that is closest to retire-
ment (46 to 55 years old).43 This result has clear policy implications. If the
goal is to stimulate more savings for retirement, this experiment shows that
workers will not fully counterbalance with saving less on their own or avoid DC
jobs completely. Mandatory DC contributions can potentially have positive
effects on overall savings. However, overall pension coverage is lower, so the
increase in overall savings is not uniformly distributed in the population.
Table 2.9: Effect of Mandatory Contributions in DC plans
Mean non-pension assets Mean DC balance
Age Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment
26-35 $48,106 $39,446 $8,965 $12,008
36-45 $137,274 $123,546 $26,900 $41,836
46-55 $221,574 $210,495 $59,194 $98,034
2.6.2 Complete phaseout of DB plans
The second experiment analyzes the effect of pension offer probabilities on
retirement savings and job mobility. Consistent with the pension-type shift,
this counterfactual experiment aims to uncover what we should expect to ob-
serve in terms of pension coverage and asset accumulations in a world in which
43Change in earned DB benefits is minuscule.
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defined benefit plans are completely eclipsed by define contribution plans.
This experiment involves eliminating altogether the defined benefit pen-
sion from the wage-pension offer distribution and replacing it with defined
contribution type of plan. The probability of receiving a job offer with no
pension is kept at its estimated value of 40.1 percent, while the probability of
receiving an offer with a DC plan is increased to 59.9 percent. An additional
assumption is that there is no adjustment in offered wages. Essentially, the
experiment assumes that all employers who used to offer DB plans now switch
to DC plans and they adjust their offered wage according to the already esti-
mated wage-offer distribution. Still, because workers’ histories are simulated
using the initial conditions as of age 26 in the data, we would expect to see a
small percentage of older workers in the future holding DB-type jobs – those
are the ones who stayed with their initial DB-sponsoring employer.
Table 2.10: Effect of Complete Phaseout of DB plans
Mean non-pension assets Mean DC balance Mean earned annual
defined benefit
Age Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment
26-35 $48,106 $47,345 $8,965 $9,972 $793 $524
36-45 $137,274 $134,867 $26,900 $32,712 $ 2,160 $770
46-55 $221,574 $219,246 $59,194 $73,385 $3,958 $841
The elimination of DB-type offers leads to a slight decrease in overall
pension coverage, from 68.7 percent to 68.3 percent. By the time they reach
84
46-55 years of age, virtually all of the workers with pension coverage have a
DC-type plan (99.3 percent) – the rest are the ones who held on to their original
DB job from age 26. Because of the more mobile nature of DC plans, workers
change jobs more often, and as a result, average tenure in the population drops
almost a year, – from 9.3 years in the benchmark case to 8.4 years when DB
plans are absent.
In addition, because DC-type jobs are more ubiquitous, workers at such
jobs are slightly less likely to contribute: percent of workers contributing fall
from 64.5 percent to 64 percent. However, because of the higher percentage of
workers at such jobs, the overall mean DC assets among those 46 to 55 years
old increase by $14,000 (24 percent higher than the benchmark case). This is
met by a corresponding decrease in non-pension assets of $2,000 for the same
age group.
However, to assess the overall effect on savings for retirement, we need
to take into account DB benefits as well. Because of the elimination of defined
benefit plans, workers in all age groups have less earned defined benefits from
former or current employers. On average, the annual earned DB benefit for
the oldest age group drops by $3,000, which in terms of present discounted
value as of age 50, is equivalent to a $20,000 loss in wealth. As a result, this
policy experiment suggests that overall net assets of the 46 to 55 age group
are expected to drop by an average of $8,000. Overall, this experiment raises
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concerns that the elimination of DB type of plans might leave workers with
less savings for retirement. Table 2.10 reports the statistics.
2.6.3 Suspension of tax deferral on pension
contributions
Third, I evaluate the effect of a change in the tax treatment of pension contri-
butions. The goal is to assess how important the tax incentive is in stimulating
savings. Specifically, in this experiment, tax deferral on DC contributions is
eliminated, which means that employees are now required to pay income taxes
on both their own and the employer matching contributions to the DC account.
In addition, returns on DC accumulations are taxed during working years, but
no taxes are paid on withdrawals during retirement. In this environment, the
only incentive for saving through a DC plan as compared with saving on your
own is through the employer match.
Table 2.11: Effect of Suspension of Tax Deferral on Pension Contributions
Mean non-pension assets Mean DC balance
Age Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment
26-35 $48,106 $48,247 $8,965 $7,085
36-45 $137,274 $138,223 $26,900 $21,211
46-55 $221,574 $ 223,230 $59,194 $48,995
In DB plans, only the employer makes contributions, which are also tax
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deferred. In this experiment, employees have to include in their taxable income
for the year the contribution that the employer makes on their behalf44, but
they will not pay taxes on the DB benefit while receiving it in retirement.
No tax incentives leads to a small drop of overall pension coverage,
from 68.7 percent to 68.2 percent. The flow out of DC jobs is slightly higher
than that of DB jobs – percent with DC coverage drops by 0.3 percentage
points compared with 0.2 percentage point in DB coverage, which suggests that
workers value tax incentives more in DC-type plans. Table 2.11 reports overall
drop in DC balances of 17 percent for the oldest age group (or equivalently
$10,000), which cannot be offset by the compensating increase in non-pension
assets of less than $2,000. There is almost no change in earned defined benefits.
Overall, this experiment suggests that tax incentives have higher importance
in defined contribution plans as compared with defined benefit plans. Their
elimination would result in an overall decrease in net assets of around $8,000
for the 46 to 55 age group.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the trade-off that workers face when choosing between com-
pensation in the form of wages versus pension contributions. From a policy
44The employer contribution is calculated by finding the present discounted value as of
today of the annuity that the employee earned while working during this particular year
(given his wage, tenure and vesting status). A real discount rate of 3% was used.
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standpoint, if we want to understand how people save for retirement and how
policy can affect their behavior, we need to account for the endogeneity of pen-
sion coverage. Previous studies have often overlooked the fact that workers’ job
search process simultaneously determines their wage and savings outcomes. In
this chapter I formulate, solve and estimate a life cycle model in which people
search for jobs, consume and save on their own and through their employer so
as to maximize utility. What makes this framework different from the classical
job search model is the fact that the job offer is a wage-pension package, which
also allows both wages and pensions to be endogenously determined. The de-
cision of a worker to accept or reject a job offer is the result of an interplay
between his preferences and the set of incentives and risks associated with the
offered pension plan.
The model is estimated on a sample from the PSID data using the
method of indirect inference. It fits many aspects of the data reasonably
well. The estimates show positive correlation between wages and pensions in
the compensation packages that employers offer, as well as positive sorting of
high-productivity, highly risk-averse individuals into jobs with pensions – thus
providing no evidence for the existence of a compensating differential coming
from the employer side.
The estimates of the behavioral parameters are used to address a series
of policy questions. Switching from voluntary to mandatory contributions for
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all workers with DC-type jobs results in lower overall pension coverage, but
due to an incomplete crowdout effect of forced DC savings, the average worker
is predicted to approach retirement with as much as 10 percent more overall
assets.
Eliminating the tax incentives on pension contributions also leads to
lower pension coverage and lower DC accumulations, which are not fully offset
by an increase in non-pension savings. Last but not least, changes in the type
of plans offered (i.e., a phaseout of DB plans) would lead to higher overall
DC accumulations, but on average about 3 percent lower overall savings for
retirement.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.12: Parameters Held Fixed in Estimation
Layoff rate 0.07
Discount factor 1/(1+0.03)
Job offer rate if employed 0.3
Job offer rate if unemployed exp(−2+0.18age−0.0016age
2)
1+exp(−2+0.18age−0.0016age2)
Employee contribution rate DC 0.06
Employer match rate DC 0.5
Generosity factor DB 0.015
Rate of return on assets (mean) 0.046
Rate of return on assets (st. dev.) 0.12
Consumption floor 0
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